The U.S. deposit insurance system also encourages risk-taking by depository tnstitutions. Because depositors are protected in the event of bank failure (at least to the limit of insurance coverage), they do not require banks to pay risk premia on deposit interest rates, and so a bank's cost of funds does not increase proportionately with increases in risk. The relatively high rate of failure among insured banks suggests that the regulations intended to limit excessive risk-taking were not entirely effective. Insured Kansas banks had significantly lower capital to asset ratios than non-insured banks, and insured banks seem to have taken greater risks as they approached failure. 28 References in the state bank commissioner's reports also indicate that some banks circumvented deposit interest rate ceilings, and that loopholes in the insurance law permitted banks to attract "brokered" deposits, much like those offered by S&Ls in the 1980s: 29
By many banks the law has been held out as an inducement to obtain money on time certificates, and which transactions are really not deposits in the proper sense of the term, but rather money borrowed by the bank. A provision that the payment of the deposit should be guaranteed only to the person, firm or corporation who originally made it~and not to any assignee or transferee, has been suggested.
The apparent abuse of the insurance system and relative riskiness of insured banks suggests that counties where a high percentage of banks were insured likely had higher bank failure rates as a consequence. Since comprehensive county-level data on economic activity is unavailable for the l920s, however, I use the change in county population as a proxy. Presumably, the faster a county's population grew, the greater was the demand for banking services, and the less likely were bank failures. A declining or slowly growing population might reflect a weak economy, and therefore a higher bank failure rate.
One argument often made against branch banking is that it leads to consolidation of the industry and reduces competition. In rural areas ... low population density required numerous, widely dispersed banking offices. Many banks were needed to serve the growing demand for bank services in the presence of the strict limits placed on branching, and the number of these banks was constrained by the legal minimum capital requirements 32
Like most midwestern states, Kansas was a unit-banking state during the 1920s, with over 1000 small independent banks in operation.
The number of banks might have been even higher in the absence of a minimum capital requirement of $10,000 on state-chartered banks. Loan losses and declining loan demand reduced profitability and probably led stockholders of some banks to liquidate or merge with another bank.
Other banks likely found it advantageous to switch to national charters to maintain depositor confidence as state chartered bank failures rose.
Moreover, as the failures of insured banks increased, so too did the assessments that member banks were required to pay for insurance.
Switching to a federal charter was one way a bank could withdraw from the system. 38
Of Regression estimates for STFRATE are reported in Table 1 , and those for SUSRATE in Table 2 .42 Equations 1.1 and 1.2, and 2.1 and 2.2, were estimated using all 105 counties, while Equations 1.3 and 1.4, and 2.3 and 2.4, were estimated after omitting the 23 counties that had fewer than five state banks. Only three of these counties had any bank failures from 1920 to 1926, but in counties with few banks the impact of even a single failure on the dependent variable is large. This is also true of the ratio of insured to total banks. Three counties had only one bank. In two, the bank was not insured, and hence the value of DIRATIO is 0. In the third county, the bank was insured, making the value of DIRATIO equal to 1. Because a single bank has such a large influence, it seems reasonable to omit counties which had few banks. 43
As is evident, the results are affected by doing so.
When no counties are omitted, the impact of agricultural distress on bank failures is most apparent. Counties where the value per acre of farm land and buildings fell the most from 1920 to 1925 suffered the highest bank failure rates. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the declines tended to be largest in eastern counties, where the bank failure rates were the highest. The coefficient on the percent change in total farm land is neither economically or statistically significant, however, perhaps because it is an inadequate proxy for the change in land under cultivation.
Deposit insurance is most useful for explaining differences in failure rates in counties with five or more state banks, although its coefficient is also marginally significant in Equations 1.1 and 1.2.
That the point estimates of the deposit insurance coefficient are more precise when counties with fewer than five banks are omitted is not surprising. Counties with few banks tended to be sparsely populated and located in the western part of the state. The average ratio of insured to total banks in these counties was lower than that of counties with five or more banks, but the dispersion of DIRATIO was higher since the influence of a single bank's membership status on the ratio in counties with few banks is large. 44
While the results indicate that county bank failure rates were related positively to the ratio of insured to total banks, I do not find that the interaction of farm distress and deposit insurance significantly affected failure rates. It does not seem that the effect of farm distress was higher where deposit insurance membership was more prevalent.
The coefficient on~POP has the anticipated sign and, in Equations Notes: standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (one-tail tests). log like, is the value of the log likelihood function. LR is the likelihood ratio test statistic. 
